Events Securing Finance in the Age of AI · Secure.com X ZIG Finance · London, 12 Nov Register now

PHP2Shell Check Point Attacks Turn Firewalls Into Launchpads for ESXi Wipers

PHP2Shell Check Point attacks gave intruders root on unpatched gateways and wiped ESXi hosts. Get the IOCs, fixed builds and next steps.

PHP2Shell Check Point attack chain from Mobile Access portal exploit to ESXi wiper in five steps

PHP2Shell Check Point Campaign Drops TSGA Backdoor on Unpatched Firewalls

PHP2Shell Check Point attacks gave intruders root on unpatched Security Gateways, then a backdoor, then a path to VMware. At some Israeli organizations, the attack ended with wiped ESXi hosts. The fix had shipped a week earlier.

  • Who should care: Anyone running Check Point Security Gateways with Mobile Access exposed to the internet.
  • What could go wrong: Root on your firewall, a backdoor that edits its own logs, and wiped VMware hosts.
  • Do this: Confirm your gateway build today. Then hunt, because a patch won’t remove an implant.
  • Worth remembering: A firewall is a server with a public IP. Hunt on it like one.

What Happened?

The first wave of PHP2Shell Check Point intrusions started October 30, 2026, and targeted Israeli organizations through Mobile Access portals. PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) is a pair of PHP runtime bugs rated CVSS 9.2. It gave attackers code execution as the portal service account. A broader second wave on November 2 hit several countries and sectors, with no destruction seen, according to Check Point Research.

Timeline · PHP2Shell to Check Point
The patch was out. Seven days later, the intrusions began.

How a PHP runtime bug turned into a firewall campaign in under three weeks.

OCT 17
First PHP2Shell exploit attempt recorded by honeypots, four days before disclosure.
OCT 21
PHP ships fixes: 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35.
OCT 23
Check Point fixes available for Security Gateways and Management.
OCT 26
CISA adds PHP2Shell to KEV.
··· 7 DAYS OF PATCH WINDOW ···
OCT 30
Wave one hits Israeli organizations. Some end with ESXi wipers.
NOV 2
Wave two spreads across countries and sectors. No destruction seen.
NOV 12
Check Point Research publishes the chain, TSGA analysis and IOCs.

Roughly two dozen customers were hit between October 30 and November 4.

How the PHP2Shell Check Point Attack Chain Works

CVE-2026-123039, a missing-authorization flaw in the Gaia OS DynamicCLI process (CVSS 7.8), took attackers from the portal account to root. They dropped PHP webshells, the TSGA backdoor, and the gogo scanner. Then they used SSH and the vpxuser account to reach an ESXi host and run the destroy_v6 wiper.

Attack chain · Check Point Security Gateways
From a VPN portal to a wiped hypervisor in five moves.

The firewall was the way in. Every step after that ran with root on a device most teams never hunt on.

01 · ACCESS
PHP2Shell on Mobile Access
Unauthenticated code execution as the portal service account.
CVE-2026-109618/9
02 · ROOT
DynamicCLI abuse
One request to a local socket runs commands as root.
CVE-2026-123039
03 · PERSIST
Webshells + TSGA
Backdoor steals config, hides in backups, edits firewall logs.
TSGA · TSProxy
04 · MOVE
Scan and pivot
gogo maps the network, then SSH into ESXi as vpxuser.
gogo · SSH
05 · DESTROY
destroy_v6 wiper
Files zeroed and deleted, political notes left behind.
DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt

Wave two on November 2 reached multiple countries and sectors, with no data destruction observed.

What’s the Impact?

Check Point counts about two dozen affected customers. TSGA steals gateway configuration, survives in backups and snapshots, injects into processes, and tampers with binary firewall logs. So the device meant to record a PHP2Shell Check Point break-in can hide one. In wave one, that access ended with the destruction of virtualization infrastructure.

Who’s Behind the PHP2Shell Check Point Campaign?

TSGA and its TSProxy component are modified versions of PhiliKit. That toolkit is linked to the China nexus group Armory Castle (formerly UNC5221) and to earlier Ivanti attacks. Check Point won’t make that call with high confidence. A wiper, politically themed DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes, and an Israel focus are unusual for that group. An access broker, a false flag or a smoke screen are all still possible.

How to Avoid This

  • Update to R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132 or R81.20 Take 174, or install the November Jumbo Hotfix. Our PHP2Shell fix guide covers the PHP side.
  • Hunt for zz*.tpl files in the Mobile Access templates folder, plus /tmp/.bd.log, /tmp/.p_sock and /lib/libcpfwcommon.so.
  • Rebuild any gateway that shows signs of compromise, and rotate every credential and key it stored.
  • Check ESXi logs for SSH logins by vpxuser, and turn SSH off on hosts that don’t need it.
  • Block 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168, and cut Mobile Access exposure where you can.

The full PHP2Shell Check Point indicator set is below. watchTowr and Help Net Security track the wider PHP2Shell picture.

Indicators of Compromise · PHP2Shell on Check Point
What to hunt for on your gateways right now.

Hashes, paths and infrastructure tied to the October 30 to November 4, 2026 campaign against Check Point Mobile Access portals. Run these against gateway file systems, ESXi hosts and firewall logs.

File hashes (SHA256)
tpl webshell
edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3
slot_CPconfigdaemon (TSGA)
4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8
CPconfigdaemon
d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63
gogo (scanner)
3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90
destory_v6 (wiper)
c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237
DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt
0522937c0c0337be54fe25493539e5f5f8ceb9742c980aaff1cfc9515f3a96f7
philistine
ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7
libdssafe.so
fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654da
Paths and artifacts on the gateway
Webshells
zz*.tpl in the Mobile Access templates directory
challenge_render.tpl in the portal directory
/tmp/.up.tpl (upload path)
TSGA backdoor
/tmp/CPconfigdaemon, relaunched as slot_CPconfigdaemon
/tmp/.bd.log
TSProxy
/lib/libcpfwcommon.so
/tmp/.p_sock (Unix socket)
Session artifacts
/opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/ files containing upload_progress_pwn
Webshell key
zz2026 (hardcoded)
Network
130.94.19[.]204130.94.19[.]168
LightNode VPS infrastructure
ESXi and CVEs
SSH login as vpxuser/tmp/des wiperDREAM_ANNEXATION.txt
CVE-2026-109618CVE-2026-109619CVE-2026-123039

Source: Check Point Research, November 12, 2026. A clean scan does not prove a clean gateway: TSGA can tamper with binary firewall logs.

Patched Is a Claim. Proven Is a Fact.

The fix was public seven days before the first break-in. What failed was follow-through: the patch tracking grunt work most teams never have time for. Here’s how to prove a PHP2Shell patch actually took effect.

  • AI teammates attack your internet-facing gateways and VPN portals the way real attackers do, and flag what’s still open.
  • Exploited flaws like PHP2Shell move to the top of the queue, ranked by what’s actually reachable from outside.
  • Hardening runs under rules your team sets, with approvals where you want a human in the loop.
  • Every fix gets retested and proven closed, with evidence ready for audit.
  • Your analysts get back the hours they spend chasing build numbers across devices.

Attack. Harden. Prove. Repeat.

PHP2Shell Check Point FAQs

What are the PHP2Shell Check Point attacks?
A campaign that began October 30, 2026, against unpatched Check Point Security Gateways with Mobile Access exposed. Attackers used PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) for code execution, CVE-2026-123039 for root, then planted the TSGA backdoor. Some Israeli victims had their VMware ESXi hosts wiped.
Which Check Point builds fix these flaws?
R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, and R81.20 Take 174 carry the fix. The November Jumbo Hotfix also covers it. Check Point made fixes available on October 23, 2026.
Does patching remove the TSGA backdoor?
No. A patch closes the way in but does not remove an implant that is already there. TSGA can survive in backups and snapshots, so rebuild a compromised gateway and rotate every credential and key it stored.
How do I check if my gateway was compromised?
Look for zz*.tpl files in the Mobile Access templates folder, /tmp/.bd.log, /tmp/.p_sock and /lib/libcpfwcommon.so. Check ESXi logs for SSH logins by vpxuser and search for connections to 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168. TSGA can edit firewall logs, so a clean log is not proof.
Who is behind the PHP2Shell Check Point intrusions?
Check Point has not attributed the campaign with high confidence. The TSGA tooling is based on PhiliKit, which is linked to the China nexus group Armory Castle (formerly UNC5221). The wiper and political notes do not fit that group, so a false flag or an access broker is still possible.