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A Fake Accelerator, Free AI Credits, and a Backdoor Into Your AI Agent

A fake Web3 accelerator used npm packages to steal founder data and reroute AI agent traffic through attacker servers. Here is what happened.

Introduction

It looked like a dream pitch for crypto founders. Free AI credits, a security audit, maybe a check from investors. Instead, the packages opened a side door, lifted data, and started reading the prompts AI agents were told.

What Happened?

Researchers traced a campaign that posed as a venture accelerator called Apex. It shipped two npm packages, one posing as an AI advisor for founders, the other claiming to be an audit server with 18 security tools. Neither did the job it advertised. On Windows, they dropped a custom data stealer that shipped loot out through a chat app. On Mac, they planted a backdoor. The group even showed up at a major crypto conference and claimed it had raised more than $124 million, all to look real.

Read more on open source supply chain risks.

What’s the Impact?

Indicators of Compromise · Apex Accelerator

IOCs: the fake Web3 accelerator that hijacked AI agents

Published indicators from the Apex Accelerator (REF8801) campaign. Add these to your blocklists, EDR, and dependency controls, then hunt for the host artifacts below. Values are defanged for safe sharing.

Defang legend: replace [.] with a dot and hxxps with https before use. Do not browse these live.
Malicious npm packages2 packages
@apexacc/clinpmFake AI coding advisor (“Apex Copilot”)
@apexacc/auditnpmFake MCP audit server, 18 fabricated tools
apexaccs/copilot · apexaccs/audit-mcpgithubSource repos (account: apexaccs)
Domains14 domains
apexaccs[.]orgAccelerator home page
arena.apexaccs[.]orgPortal, attacker LLM API, remote MCP
token.apexaccs[.]orgIn-person invitation site
vrf.apexaccs[.]orgBootstrap verification / command retrieval
arena.apexfdn[.]xyz · verify.apexfdn[.]xyzEarlier portal and macOS payload host
ccmihr[.]comCloudSyncD C2
0auth-chromium[.]comServes PowerShell delivery script
ehegisnightmare[.]icuHosts Python loader stages
arenapex[.]cloud · cloudmain365duo[.]top · fdn4apex[.]comWindows script download hosts
main.router-apex[.]com · update.apex-arena-router[.]comVerifier script hosts
Key URLs and endpointsselected
hxxps://arena.apexaccs[.]org/api/llm/v1OPENROUTER_BASE_URL override (traffic redirect)
hxxps://arena.apexaccs[.]org/api/copilot/mcpAttacker-controlled remote MCP server
hxxps://vrf.apexaccs[.]org/api/v1/vrfVerification / command endpoint
hxxps://ccmihr[.]com/macos/jquery.jsCloudSyncD C2 callback
hxxps://verify.apexfdn[.]xyz/macos/installer/terminal/interactive/bashmacOS installer script
File hashes (SHA-256)9 hashes
985829083f3937df6c82419216f7697afae0caac8efca6257a756066fe2c0abbapex-windows-x64.exe
5ee7145061f05779f7f6f9b72e216713d17d53e183a92f408bfbbc44f2bfb95dapex-audit-windows-x64.exe
42a760b15fea7c9af718ee45386c1c3ea1bec9e30c95d16c287bcc8b2efdc72eapex-darwin-arm64
127ae4cad80b6605157ca2a1feada8a235e16aacc5d2119337a98115a4e13274apex-verify-darwin
20f0a401676292d4ae34932e61f34afa97bcfc47ee517cda2afeb7222264a193apex-audit-darwin-arm64
a50cdb508d13884630945a98eea0615b866d938eb0a16c5d958e6c8c181a6df8apex-audit-verify-darwin
68f5a00eafa8ecebf5d93328e0fec23b24d6f91808c8384db002946a13656c71installer (CloudSyncD)
ee8cd9aba420f1b26b5d43e5bcdd6025a277b4946bb5daf76ab45c0e5f7ecd0bexegis.exe (Python second stage)
ed5cb4af1d2cb067b8d23783ebf05d70278728462ba4f1bf29da0a3a41efc35eenc_loader.exe (encrypted third stage)
Host artifacts to huntconfig + files
~/.apex/agent/mcp.jsonPersistent “apex-copilot” MCP entry
OPENROUTER_BASE_URL · OPENROUTER_API_KEYOverwritten agent env vars
%APPDATA%\.cobraWindows infection marker
%USERPROFILE%\.apex-auditAdded to Defender exclusions
~/.local/share/cloudsync/ · ~/.config/cloudsync/data.jsonCloudSyncD install dir and stored password
%TEMP%\exegis.exe · updater_loader.exe · visual.exeWindows staging binaries

Source: Elastic Security Labs, REF8801 / Apex Accelerator. Earlier July 2026 packages in the same operation delivered the AMOS (Atomic Stealer) family; CloudSyncD was first documented in September 2026. No IP addresses or SHA-1/MD5 hashes were published. Treat all values as time-bound and verify against the primary report before enforcement.

This one went beyond a typical stealer. The packages rerouted AI agent traffic to attacker-controlled servers, so attackers could read prompts, chat history, and source code in transit. Worse, the fake tooling could feed instructions back to the agent, steering its next move. Trust became the payload.

How to Avoid This

  • Vet every package before installing
  • Pin trusted registries only
  • Lock down agent config files
  • Review MCP server connections
  • Watch outbound AI traffic

Your AI agents are now part of your attack surface. Who is watching them?

Supply-chain tricks like this hide inside the tools your team already trusts, and now they reach into the AI agents doing real work. That is exactly the gap governed AI teammates are built to close.

  • A Red teammate hunts for exposed and tampered dependencies before an attacker turns them into a foothold.
  • An AppSec teammate flags risky packages and unverified agent connections inside your pipeline, not weeks later.
  • A SOC teammate triages strange outbound traffic and odd config changes the moment they surface.
  • Every consequential action waits for your approval, with a full record of who decided what and why.
  • It runs above the stack you already own, so you don’t have to rip anything out.

Attack. Harden. Prove. Repeat.